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Extrapolative Inference and Analogical 
Reasoning in the Empirical Sciences
In the present paper, I am going to propose a distinction be-
tween two types of inferences which are used in the empirical sci-
ences: extrapolation and per analogiam reasoning. First, this issue 
is interesting due to the practical relevance of both of them and the 
necessity of that distinction, which is of great importance from the 
methodological and philosophical perspectives. Second, there are 
not many publications dedicated to its deeper analysis from the 
perspectives of analytical philosophy and the philosophy of science.
Several publications1 that have appeared in recent years have 
undoubtedly made an important contribution to helping fill this 
gap, but the sensu stricto philosophical analysis is still at an early 
stage. Obviously, my aim in this text is not to fill this void; rather, 
my goal is to identify some important issues that are necessary to 
answer the question of the nature and significance of extrapolation 
in the empirical sciences.
In addition to an analogy, there is also a need to consider dif-
ferences that exist between extrapolation and induction as well 
1 See, for instance: D. Steel, Across the Boundaries. Extrapolation in Biology 
and Social Science, Oxford 2008; F. Guala, Extrapolation, Analogy and Compara-
tive Process Tracing, „Philosophy of Science” 2010, Vol. 77, pp. 1070–1082; M. Hell-
er, Zasady ekstrapolacji. Uwagi na marginesie kosmologii, „Zagadnienia Filozo-
ficzne w Nauce” 1978/79, nr 1, pp. 23–31.
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.15633/ss.687
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as statistical inference. This text should therefore be regarded as 
a brief introduction to this topic, as I will limit myself to indicating 
the most important differences between the proposed definition of 
extrapolation and reasoning by analogy, which also plays an im-
possible to ignore role in the formulation of scientific claims.
In light of these comments, some theses presented in the paper 
may be controversial. I will be very grateful for any constructive 
criticism and suggestions.
1. What is extrapolative inference?
It is not easy to briefly describe the essence of extrapolative in-
ference in a way that does not miss any of the extremely import-
ant issues associated with it, especially considering the relatively 
small amount of literature concerning this issue from the philo-
sophical perspective. Even then I will make an attempt at conduct-
ing a synthetic analysis of issues relevant to us, paying attention to 
some of those that are the most interesting from the point of view 
of the explication of the relationship between per analogiam rea-
soning and extrapolation.
I limit these considerations to extrapolation inference in the 
empirical sciences. Hence it is necessary to start by pointing to an 
obvious, but in this context also quite important assertion. There-
fore, several features of scientific sentences are significant from the 
point of view of the analysis of the epistemic character.
First, these are generality and universality; namely, the truth-
fulness in the sense similar to the classic meaning.
However, the existence of both the first and second of these char-
acteristics is questionable in light of the cognitive limitations of the 
human intellect, in particular its temporal and spatial dimensions.
Therefore, it is noticeable that there is a certain tension between, 
on the one hand, actual cognitive capabilities that affect the ability 
to recognize certain statements as legitimate and credible and, on 
the other, the sentences formulated by representatives of the nat-
ural sciences that describe the phenomena occurring in the world, 
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i.e., the laws of nature. I will try to clarify that issue in my further 
remarks, but now I will explain the perspective they are turned into.
It should be stressed that these considerations are carried out 
from the perspective of scientific realism, the view according to 
which science generally describes existing reality, and the belief in 
this description is justified. It is relevant to indicate that presup-
positions due to the acceptance of an anti-realistic attitude under-
mine the sense of considering the problem of the legitimacy of both 
the scientific statements and nature of the aforementioned tension. 
Of course, anti-realism is not a homogenous position, and analyz-
ing its varieties is far beyond the interest of this paper. Therefore, 
I will confine myself to two of its types.
First, following the trend of conceptual anti-realism (which is, 
in fact, a form of epistemological relativism) we recognize that it 
is not possible to access the “objective” reality, and our knowledge 
may be built only by more or less perfect conceptual schemes. The 
issue of the relationship between universal sentences and pos-
sessed “knowledge” becomes less important, as scientific ascertain-
ments in the context of such a position do not fully and accurately 
describe the objective existing reality, and thus do not have the sta-
tus of universality. The acceptance of a simpler version of anti-re-
alism, according to which it is not possible to know actual reality 
(this is in many aspects identical to skepticism) causes the extrap-
olation problem to become devoid of any significance; it cannot be 
an important epistemological issue any longer, for if we learn that 
the acquisition any kind of knowledge is not possible, neither is it 
possible to infer by extrapolation.
Consequently, as stated previously, there is a certain tension 
and perhaps even a paradox associated with the nature of our sci-
entific cognition in the realistic perspective. Above all, our knowl-
edge is always fragmentary due to the limited capacity of our intel-
lect. Our aim, however, is to formulate general statements, which 
articulate universal (which, therefore, are in force across the entire 
universe at any time) laws of nature in a manner consistent with 
the real state of things (and thus sentences are true in the classi-
cal sense). Despite these limitations, what is crucial is that science 
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“works”: we can make predictions, and it is possible to use acquired 
knowledge for specific purposes (one can call them “technology”). 
This fact leads to the conclusion that the goal to which we aspire, 
as mentioned above, is at least partially achieved.
At this point an extremely important question from the philo-
sophical point of view comes to light: how is it possible that science 
“works”, although it is impossible to formulate peremptorily true 
sentences?
To take part in the discussion on this issue, it is necessary to in-
dicate the nature of this impossibility.
First, it is not possible to clearly determine the veracity of a par-
ticular general statement describing a state of affairs or, in other 
words, its verification. This would require an analysis of all possi-
ble cases described by the sentence.
In view of the limitations of human cognition, this appears as 
impossible neither in theory nor in practice. The sentence is true 
not only at one moment (hic et nunc), but it is so always. As a re-
sult, in order to legitimately declare its truthfulness, it would be 
necessary to revise the sentence in relation to the states of affairs 
that occurred in the past and those that will take place in the fu-
ture.
This causes verification to be impossible even in theory: a finite 
number of available observations will never be enough. As Rudolf 
Carnap has noted:
If verification is understood as a complete and definitive establish-
ment of truth, then a universal sentence, such as a so-called law of 
physics or biology, can never be verified, a fact which has often been 
remarked. Even if each single instance of the law were supposed to be 
verifiable, the number of instances to which the law refers – i.e., the 
space-time-points – is infinite and therefore can never be exhausted by 
our observations which are always finite in number.2
2 R. Carnap, Testability and Meaning, [in:] Readings in the Philosophy of Sci-
ence, ed. H. Fleigl, M. Brodbeck, New York 1999, p. 48.
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Moreover, even the particular sentence concerning the one cer-
tain fact is not fully verifiable, because it is always possible to con-
test the results of observation or to request the verification of the 
results, check the checking, etc.
In spite of the fact that we are not able to verify any gener-
al sentence describing reality, we can test arising “particular sen-
tences that we derive from the law and from other sentences estab-
lished previously.”3
If we do not encounter any case against it, namely falsifying (or 
rather, in the context of Carnap’s philosophy, disconfirming) a par-
ticular sentence, the general law of nature becomes somehow more 
“reliable”. According to Carnap, this procedure “gradually [increas-
es] confirmation of the law.”4
An attempt to solve the problem by introducing the concept 
of falsification was proposed by Karl Popper. He recognized that 
while it does not allow us to prove a theory, logic allows for the ex-
perimental overthrow or falsification of a theory, which is in ac-
cordance with the modus tollendo tollens.5 To put it simply, hy-
pothesising and testing will provide us asymptotic approximation 
to the truth. Thus it is wrong to believe that our theories are ei-
ther true or false. They will most likely all be false, but not all of 
them already will have been refuted by that time.6 At most, as 
Popper notes, corroboration7, or recognition that the theory “has 
proved hart” is possible. This, of course, also cannot be considered 
to be a sufficient criterion for the recognition of the full adequacy 
or genuineness of a particular hypothesis. Moreover, the finding 
that a falsification can clearly reject a statement as false is also 
not undisputed.
As “pure” facts do not exist and each observation is based on 
a theoretical component, statements cannot be fully falsified (see 
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
5 K. Popper, Logic of Scientific Discovery, London–New York 2005, pp. 18 f.
6 W. Sady, Falsyfikacjonizm Karla Poppera, [in:] W. Sady, Spór o racjonalność 
naukową. Od Poincarego do Laudana, Wrocław 2000.
7 K. Popper, Logic…, pp. 248 f.
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Duhem-Quine thesis, according to which testing in science cannot 
be described by modus tollens because no theory is ever examined 
in isolation, but together with some other beliefs, and therefore in 
the case of a negative result of experiment it is not known whether 
the theory or background knowledge is refuted). Moreover, falsifi-
cation is always a greater or lesser degree of coincidence. It is pos-
sible that such circumstances could prevent it in spite of taking ef-
forts to occur in this direction.
The (of course, very briefly) presented attempts to solve the 
problem I call ad hoc that of the truth of the statements of science 
derive from the conclusion that it is not possible to establish the 
truth of general statements. Therefore, we should consider wheth-
er it is reasonable to say that the most important aspect of the sci-
entific method is to infer by extrapolation of the results of only de 
facto confirmed statements (or theses which “proved hart”).
The crucial importance of this question may be noticed in the 
context of cosmology (but also physics in general) because, on the 
one hand we possess the knowledge (i.e., set of sentences that we 
consider reliable) regarding only a (relatively) small area of the 
universe and, on the other hand, we formulate general laws which 
are in force in the whole universe. This way we extrapolate (we in-
fer by extrapolation) the known results, but only on this stretch of 
reality, to the whole, de facto unknown reality.
Is such a procedure justified? Answering this question is not ef-
fortless. Most important, we have to notice that it is not identical 
with induction, although one can find some similarities. Both of them 
are, as I will later point out, types of reasoning by generalization.
As I mentioned above, the concept of “extrapolation” is in fact 
treated primarily as a mathematical problem in the literature. 
However, even definitions that can be found in statistics textbooks 
may be useful for our philosophical analysis. For instance, its sta-
tistical definition is:
Extrapolation is based on the estimation of a hypothetical value be-
yond the study period. Statistical estimation is used in cases in which 
it is impossible or pointless to make use of a full or even a partial study.
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It also points to the essence of extrapolation within the meaning 
of the philosophy of science.
I propose the following philosophical definition of extrapolative 
inference:
The formulation of general theorems concerning all objects and 
states of affairs (laws of nature in the context of the empirical scienc-
es) on the grounds of knowledge (with the objections made above), 
only a part of them concerning certain aspects of the whole.
This is similar to the aforementioned mathematical extrapola-
tion definition relating to the function, according to which it is an
[e]xtention (a graph, curve or range of values) by inferring un-
known values from trends in the known data.8
This also shows the substance of extrapolation within the mean-
ing of philosophy.
In connection with the presentation of the extrapolation issue 
it becomes necessary to analyze the differences between it and the 
terms whose meaning is similar, which may be identified with in-
duction, analogy and statistical inference. In the following sections 
of this article I will address the relationship between extrapolative 
inference and analogical reasoning.
3. Briefly about analogies in science
The differences existing between extrapolative inference and 
analogy are significant. However, they may remain unnoticed, 
mainly due to the poor development of the philosophical approach 
to the problem of extrapolation. Therefore, I will begin by pointing 
out the most important and most frequently cited characteristics of 
per analogiam reasoning. Then I will show the key differences be-
tween analogy and extrapolation used in the natural sciences. Al-
8 Extrapolate, www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/extrapolate 
(20.08.2014).
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ready at this point it should be noted, however, that analogy plays 
a significant role9, especially in the case of special issues, which 
eventually proves extrapolative inference to be the most useful.
It is difficult to concisely describe the essence of analogical rea-
soning due to its multifaceted and significant differences in its in-
terpretation; therefore, I will confine it to the adoption of its specif-
ic understanding.
I will begin with a simple example. I assume that there are two 
states of affairs (this term will collectively determine the investi-
gated objects, events, etc.): A and A ‘, in which A is the Earth, and 
A’ is a planet discovered hundreds of light years from our solar sys-
tem, similar to Earth (referring to the nomenclature of Putnam’s 
famous example, I will call her “Twin Earth”).
The resemblance between the previously studied object and the 
one that is the target of the study is the first requirement of analo-
gy, which is also a conditio sine qua non for believing it to be a cog-
nitively valuable procedure. Mary Hesse calls it a material anal-
ogy and considers it to be a necessary element of any acceptable 
analogical argument. That similarity should imply the existence of 
some observable (or “pre-theoretic”) properties.10
Furthermore, the state of affairs in A has been relatively 
well-studied, the theory regarding A was empirically tested, all the 
predictions were confirmed and the researchers did not encounter 
any contradictory event that would falsyfy the theory. Our theory 
of the state of A may therefore be regarded as credible, and “corrob-
orated”, using Popper’s concept. Speaking in colloquial language, 
we may conclude that we have knowledge about it.
At a certain moment it turns out that there is a detached state 
of affairs in A ‘ for which we can say, due to some circumstances 
known to us, that it is probably relevantly similar to the state of 
A. For whatever reason we are not able to perform the same tests 
9 See for instance: A. Biela, 1991, [in:] A. Biela, Analogy in Science. From 
a psychological perspective, Frankfurt–New York 1991; M. Hesse, The Structure of 
Scientific Inference, Berkeley 1974.
10 M. Hesse, Models and Analogies in Science, Notre Dame 1966, p. 68 f. 
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as in a case of the state of affairs of A with respect to A’. Therefore, 
on the basis of the idea of  this similarity, we recognize that the de-
scription of the state of A is also likely to be adequate to describe 
the state of A’, and then perform the description of A’.
This discussed simple example shows that the analogy is a type of 
reasoning used to determine the characteristics, values, etc. of certain 
objects, which for various reasons are impossible to directly examine. 
A limited description of them lets us to assume that they exhibit sig-
nificant similarity (at least in some aspects) to the objects that we can 
adequately describe. Therefore, on the base of the assumption con-
cerning similarity, we formulate hypotheses about unknown objects.
They currently provide the source of knowledge about them 
that is most adequate to the highest possible degree. The results 
gained through the application of per analogiam reasoning cannot, 
however, be regarded as the fully correct description of A’ since 
they are merely a sort of approximation, based additionally on the 
always more or less questionable assumption of similarity of the 
two states of affairs.
Two features seem to be decisive and picture the essence of the 
analogical reasoning used in science. First, it always refers to the 
specific states of affairs and, secondly, is based on the explicit as-
sumption that concerns the similarity of equal states of affairs. Fi-
nally, obtained via analogy results are, ex definitione, devoid of the 
claim to authenticity. These issues present themselves quite differ-
ently if considered in light of extrapolation and it causes these two 
tools to vary significantly.
4. Analogy and extrapolation
First of all, extrapolation does not concern the specific (con-
crete) cases, but the general sentences. These cases therefore re-
late only indirectly. The essence of extrapolation in the proposed 
definition is not limited to describing the unknown states of affairs 
on the base of knowledge pertaining to the known, but to formulate 
on the basis of a limited amount of acquired data and theoretical 
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apparatus sentences, which pretend to be universally true. Even 
though it may be useful in the formulation of hypotheses, analogy 
cannot be regarded as a decisive element of the scientific method.
Secondly, the extrapolative inference does not contain an explic-
ite expressed limitation, unlike in the case of the analogy, whose 
explanatory efficacy is strongly limited by reception at the start-
ing point in the thesis of similarity, which in itself is merely a sort 
of working assumption. Laws of nature formulated by extrapola-
tion are unconditional and, from the perspective of scientific real-
ism, claim full “veracity”, i.e., they describe the phenomena in ac-
cordance with the real states of affairs.
However, it is also worth considering whether the analogy is not 
some kind of extrapolation in the narrower sense. Similarly as the 
latter, it also relies on a kind of generalization. The description of 
the known state of affairs (referring to our example A) is, in fact, 
generalized in the sense that it turns out to be useful under certain 
conditions also for the formulation of descriptions of the state of A ‘. 
The differences between the two tools, however, indicate that there 
is a need to distinguish them to prevent possible confusion. At most, 
we can talk about the existence of a wider group of reasoning by gen-
eralization (although this term is not fully adequate for the analogy).
Resume
The first aim of this paper was to present the issue of extrapola-
tion, which seems to be very interesting to study from the perspective 
of contemporary philosophy of science. For its proper explanation, it 
is crucial to distinguish this term from other concepts of similar me-
aning, such as analogy, induction or statistical inference. The second 
goal is to indicate key differences that exist between extrapolative in-
ference and analogical reasoning. This allows for the ascertaining of 
the identification of these concepts, which would be a mistake. Howe-
ver, there is no way to not notice certain similarities.
Although the objectives of extrapolation and analogy in the pre-
sented meanings are diametrically opposed, there are certain simi-
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larities between these two procedures. In both cases (as well as in 
the induction and statistical inferences) there occurs something 
that can be described as the “expansion of knowledge” in areas of re-
search we know less about or which remain fully puzzling. Only in 
this sense, then, it will be justified to determine analogy, induction 
and statistical inference as “extrapolative inferences”. However, it 
would be better to refrain from this wording to avoid ambiguity.
Summary
The primary purpose of this paper is to present the issue of extrapolation, which 
is interesting from the perspective of contemporary philosophy of science. For its 
proper explanation, it is crucial to distinguish it from terms of similar meaning, 
such as analogy, induction or statistical inference. The second goal is to indicate 
key differences that exist between extrapolative inference and analogical reaso-
ning. Because of this the ascertaining of the identification of these concepts would 
be a mistake though, of course, there is no way not to notice certain similarities.
Keywords: scientific method, extrapolation, per analogiam reasoning, philo-
sophy of science, generalization
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